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SPILLS OF NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE AND STATE 
NULLIFICATION 
Russell V. Randle* 
In May 2010, at President Obama’s request, outgoing Coast Guard 
Commandant Thad Allen delayed his retirement and became National 
Incident Commander for the response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, 
serving until the conclusion of the emergency at the end of September 
2010.  From that experience, Admiral Allen observed what he called 
“social and political nullification” of the National Contingency Plan 
(NCP) arising from public hostility to the responsible party and demands 
of state and local political officials for more active roles in the response.1    
The NCP2 is the federal regulation governing oil and hazardous 
substance response under the Oil Pollution Act (OPA),3 the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability 
Act (CERCLA),4 popularly known as Superfund, and section 311 of the 
federal Clean Water Act.5  If that rule works poorly in practice, as 
Admiral Allen’s comments suggest, then addressing “nullification” 
issues will be important for responding better to future large-scale oil 
spills and avoiding or reducing environmental damage and economic 
losses.   
                                            
 * Member, District of Columbia Bar; author, ELI OIL POLLUTION DESKBOOK; Vice-
Chair, ABA Superfund Committee; partner, Patton Boggs LLP, Washington, D.C.  The 
views expressed are the author’s own and not necessarily those of his firm or his firm’s 
clients. 
 1. NAT’L OIL SPILL COMM’N MEETING, NATIONAL OIL SPILL COMMISSION ON BP 
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING 44, 46 (2010), available at 
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Transcript-
%20Meeting%203.pdf [hereinafter ALLEN TESTIMONY] (statement of Admiral Thad 
Allen, U.S. Coast Guard, National Incident Commander for the Unified Command). 
 2. 40 C.F.R. § 300 (2010). 
 3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762 (2006). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006). 
 5. 33 U.S.C. § 1321.  
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Admiral Allen was uniquely situated to comment on such disaster 
response and problems with the NCP. Before his service as incident 
commander, he led the federal response to Hurricane Katrina and 
oversaw a 2002 simulation of government capacities to respond to a spill 
of national significance off the Louisiana coast.6  He made his 
“nullification” comments in September 2010 testimony before the 
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 
Offshore Drilling (National Commission).7  He explained that demands 
by state and local officials and the public resulted in substantial changes 
in the actual response from the approach dictated by the NCP.  Some of 
these changes, the National Commission claims, resulted in costly and 
ineffective responses, overlapping and conflicting efforts, and diversion 
of response equipment and personnel from locations which needed the 
equipment most urgently.  
This article uses Admiral Allen’s observations and subsequent 
reporting by the National Commission to highlight “nullification” and 
other problems with the spill response, to identify correctible sources of 
these problems, and to suggest changes to the NCP and related authority 
recommended to help resolve nullification and related problems.  I leave 
to other authors the discussion of environmental impact reviews of 
offshore leasing decisions and drilling permits.  
The NCP and disaster response issues addressed here include 
• assigning the lead cleanup role to the responsible party for a 
spill of national significance raised serious questions about 
the party’s competence, credibility, and culpability. These 
questions were further reinforced by the absence of 
significant in-house federal spill response capability; 
• elected state and local officials were poorly integrated into 
the spill response, and they initially understood the response 
procedures poorly.  These elected officials demanded and 
eventually played a much more active role than initially 
assigned them.  A similar political dynamic should be 
expected in future spills, requiring much greater inclusion of 
state and local elected officials in planning, practicing, and 
implementing future spill responses; 
• outside government, academic, and industry technical 
experts were poorly integrated into response efforts.  
                                            
 6. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE 
DRILLING 136-137 (2011) [hereinafter NATIONAL COMMISSION]. 
 7. See ALLEN TESTIMONY, supra note 1, at 44. 
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Similarly, the federal government initially lacked an 
independent source of information about the volume and 
flow rate of the discharge.  Far more robust federal technical 
expertise, independent sources of key information, and 
capable outside oversight contractors will be needed to 
maintain public confidence in future responses to spills of 
national significance. 
I.  RESPONSIBLE PARTY ISSUES 
A.  Cleanup under the NCP 
Section 311 of the Clean Water Act governs oil spill cleanups.8  Its 
allocation of duties has changed little since first enacted in 1970 in 
response to the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill.9   The federal government 
has broad powers under the Act to respond to discharges or threats of 
discharge of oil or hazardous substances in navigable waters or 
shorelines,10 including the authority to “remove, and if necessary, destroy 
a vessel discharging, or threatening to discharge, by whatever means are 
available.”11  These powers are to be exercised “in accordance with the 
National Contingency Plan and any appropriate Area Contingency 
Plan.”12   
Private parties, including an “owner or operator participating in 
[removal] efforts . . . shall act in accordance with the National 
Contingency Plan and the applicable response plan,” which may include 
the Area Contingency Plan and the Facility Response Plan, both required 
under section 311(j).13  The Facility Response Plan should respond “to 
the maximum extent practicable, to a worst case, discharge . . . of oil.”14  
The liability provisions of OPA make “responsible” parties such as 
an offshore oil lease holder like BP strictly liable for “removal costs,”15 
i.e., the costs of containing and cleaning up the spill.  Consistent with 
this financial obligation, the NCP provides that the responsible party may 
be permitted to undertake the response as directed by the On-Scene 
                                            
 8. 33 U.S.C. § 1321.  
 9. Compare Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 2, 84 Stat. 100 (1970), with 33 U.S.C. § 1321.  
 10. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c). 
 11. Id. § 1321(c)(1)(B)(iii).  
 12. Id. § 1321(c)(1)(A).  
 13. Id. § 1321(c)(3)((B). 
 14. Id. § 1321(j)(5)(A). 
 15. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). 
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Coordinator, consistent with the provisions of the NCP.16  Under OPA, 
the federal government may conduct the cleanup itself and send the bill 
to the responsible party, although that is not the preferred approach in 
practice. 
Private parties, in fact, conduct most spill cleanups under federal 
supervision.  This was the approach reportedly used in Louisiana before 
the Deepwater Horizon disaster, an approach which appeared to work 
well.17   
The 1990 OPA statute amended section 311(b) to add strong federal 
authority to order private party response efforts.  A court may impose 
severe penalties on any responsible party who “without sufficient cause” 
fails to properly carry out removal of the discharge under a federal 
order.18  This approach is quite consistent with the “polluter pays” 
approach under federal Superfund, which was used as a model for many 
of the OPA provisions.  Most Superfund cleanups are conducted by 
potentially responsible parties pursuant to consent agreements or 
administrative orders. 
B.  Conflicting Roles 
Admiral Allen testified that this system had worked well for twenty 
years after the enactment of OPA but broke down in the extreme 
circumstances of the Deepwater Horizon spill: “I think the public’s 
tolerance for a responsible party is inversely proportional to the size of 
the spill.”19   The large size of the spill, the loss of life, and the 
spectacular nature of the casualty inevitably raised questions about the 
“responsible party’s” competence, culpability, and credibility. The 
atrophy of federal spill response capability reinforced these questions.   
1.  Why Do We Think the Party Who Created This Mess Can Fix It? 
The public and the press reacted badly to the prominent role BP was 
playing as the “responsible party,” as it had been legally designated at 
                                            
 16. 40 C.F.R. §  300.320(a)(3) (2010).  
 17. NAT’L OIL SPILL COMM’N MEETING, NATIONAL OIL SPILL COMMISSION ON BP 
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING 110-112 (2010), available at 
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Transcript-
%20Meeting%203.pdf [hereinafter STANTON TESTIMONY] (statement of Captain Edward 
Stanton, New Orleans, U.S. Coast Guard). 
 18. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(7)(B)(i), noted in ENVTL. LAW INST., OIL POLLUTION 
DESKBOOK 12 (1991).   
 19. See ALLEN TESTIMONY, supra note 1, at 43.  
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the outset of the spill response.  This skepticism was understandable.  
The explosion, the fire, the loss of the rig, the death of eleven crewmen, 
and the injury of even more made for spectacular television.  That 
spectacle was followed by distressing footage of large volumes of oil 
coming to the surface and the increasingly frantic stories about the 
failure to contain it.  People reasonably wondered why the party 
“responsible” for creating this dramatic disaster was believed to be 
competent to implement the remedy, even under Coast Guard 
supervision. 
2.  Why Is the Government Putting A Criminal Suspect in Charge of 
Public Safety? 
Justice Department guidance for criminal prosecutions in 
environmental cases has made clear for more than two decades that 
criminal investigations are in order where lives are lost, serious 
environmental damage occurs, or there is widespread public attention to 
the matter.20  In this instance, all three factors favoring criminal 
investigation were present.  Without identifying BP, Attorney General 
Eric Holder confirmed the fact of such a criminal investigation,21 a 
confirmation which should have surprised no one.   
The tension between OPA’s strict liability approach and the Justice 
Department’s criminal prosecution guidance became quite apparent in 
this case, begging the question: Why should a party under criminal 
investigation for possible misconduct in causing the spill be leading the 
spill response?  In BP’s case, that question became more pointed because 
of past criminal proceedings arising out of the 2005 explosion at BP’s 
Texas City, Texas refinery, in which fifteen workers were killed and 
many more injured, as well as earlier proceedings arising out of oil spill 
problems on Alaska’s North Slope.22 
                                            
 20. See David M. Uhlmann, Environmental Crime Comes of Age: The Evolution of 
Criminal Enforcement in the Environmental Regulatory Scheme, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 
1223, 1246-47 (2009) (noting examples of prosecutions where significant environmental 
damage or fatalities have occurred). 
 21. Matt Grutman & Bradley Blackburn, Attorney General Eric Holder Announces 
Criminal Investigation into Gulf Oil Spill, ABC NEWS, June 1, 2010, 
http://abcnews.go.com/WN/bp-gulf-oil-spill-cut-cap-begins-
president/story?id=10797393. 
 22. Sarah Lyall, In BP’s Record, a History of Boldness and Costly Blunders, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/business/energy-
environment/13bprisk.html. 
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3.  Why Should Anyone Believe the Responsible Party? 
The safety and environmental record of offshore oil drilling have 
been controversial political issues since the Santa Barbara Oil Spill in 
1969.  For several decades, the federal government has restricted or 
forbidden oil drilling off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the lower 
forty-eight states, and off of the Florida Gulf Coast.  The oil industry and 
its supporters argued for many years that offshore safety records had 
greatly improved over the offshore safety records in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s.  The industry had considerable operating experience to 
support that argument.  These arguments were making political headway 
in 2010: President Obama endorsed increased offshore drilling on March 
31, 2010.23  Three weeks later, the Deepwater Horizon exploded and 
sank, prompting many second thoughts. 
Any company suffering this disaster would have encountered 
increased skepticism, given the political history and heated past 
arguments.  These credibility problems grew worse as successive efforts 
to control the well failed.  Public reaction seemed to alternate between 
ridicule and rage.24 
4.  Why Doesn’t the Federal Government Conduct the Cleanup? 
Section 311 of the Clean Water Act not only authorizes, but requires 
the federal government to respond to oil spills.25  Despite the addition of 
such mandatory language in 1990, the great depth of this discharge 
meant that the federal government lacked the in-house equipment, 
personnel, and expertise to take over the Deepwater Horizon cleanup 
operation.  According to the Commission Report, when Secretary of the 
Interior Salazar asked staff at the Minerals Management Service (MMS) 
what they would do if the government took over the cleanup, he was 
                                            
 23. John M. Broder, Obama to Open Offshore Areas to Drilling for First Time, N. Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/science/earth/31energy.html. 
 24. One particular satiric video reportedly had over eleven million views by mid-
February 2011. UBCcommedy.com, BP Spills Coffee, YOUTUBE,  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2AAa0gd7ClM (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). Public 
outrage was the theme of a number of stories. E.g., Kristin Jensen & Jim Snyder, BP 
Hires Army of Washington Insiders to Help Manage Outrage Over Oil Spill, BLOOMBERG 
(June 17, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-17/bp-hires-army-of-
washington-insiders-to-help-manage-outrage-over-oil-spill.html.  
 25. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
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advised that the MMS would have to contract with a major oil company 
to carry out the work.26   
The absence of this independent federal response capability 
reinforced the public impression that regulators were much too close to 
the offshore oil industry they were supposed to regulate. Past scandals 
with MMS personnel accepting drugs and sexual favors from industry 
counterparts27 made the impression worse.  Reliance on BP and its 
contractors for most of the cleanup effort was an unpleasant necessity, 
resulting from the failure of the federal government to build the capacity 
to respond to such deepwater spills, not from a careful choice between 
capable public and private party response teams. 
II.  FEDERAL ROLES: THEORY AND REALITY 
A.  Legal Theory: Federal Preeminence in Oil Spill Cleanup 
Although OPA tracks many Superfund provisions,28 a comparison 
between Superfund statutory language and OPA/Clean Water Act section 
311 language shows that Congress expected state and local governments 
to play a much less active role in maritime oil spill response actions than 
such governments play in responding to Superfund sites on shore.  For 
example, CERCLA section 104(d) provides for cooperative agreements 
between states and the federal government, under which states are 
reimbursed for much of their effort to conduct Superfund response 
actions.29  The federal government is ordinarily obliged to defer placing a 
site on the National Priority List (NPL) for Superfund cleanup if the state 
is conducting an adequate cleanup and requests such deferral.30 Note that 
NPL sites are the most severely contaminated ones under CERCLA and 
qualify for long-term remedial action.  CERCLA also provides elaborate 
procedures to assure state involvement in determining what sites are 
placed on the NPL in that state, as well as in the choice of remedy and 
the allocation of liability for the site.31   
By contrast, neither OPA nor section 311 of the federal Clean Water 
Act requires such elaborate consultation with and deferral to the states.  
                                            
 26. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 136. 
 27. Charlie Savage, Sex, Drug Use and Graft Cited in Interior Department, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/09//11/ washington/11royalty.html. 
 28. ENVTL. LAW REPORTER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, OIL POLLUTION 
DESKBOOK 3 (1991).   
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c )(5), (d) (2006). 
 30. Id. § 9605(h). 
 31. Id.  § 9621(f). 
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Instead, section 311(d) of the Clean Water Act establishes the 
requirements for the NCP, with a far stronger emphasis on federal 
response.32  References to state and local agencies concern 
“coordination” and providing for reimbursement for certain state 
response activities.33  While state and local governments are expected to 
be participants in Area Committees and Area Contingency Plans, the 
President appoints the members “from qualified personnel of Federal, 
State, and local agencies.”34  There is no formal role for state and local 
elected officials.  The Gulf Strike Team’s informal handbook “An 
FOSC’s Guide to Environmental Response” mentions governors only 
once as someone to be notified of a spill.35 
Area Contingency Plans are to be implemented “in conjunction with 
the National Contingency Plan,” and to detail the “responsibilities of an 
owner or operator and of Federal, State, and local agencies in removing a 
discharge,” identify the most sensitive areas, list available equipment, 
dispersants and personnel available to address the discharge, as well as 
local scientists “with expertise in the environmental effects of spills of 
the types of oil typically transported in the area.”36  The Area 
Contingency Plan was also supposed to be integrated into offshore 
facility response plans, such as the one for the Deepwater Horizon.37  
B.  Federal Preeminence, Federal Nonfeasance 
While the Coast Guard was responsible for both the National and 
Area Contingency Planning efforts and response efforts, the MMS at the 
Department of the Interior was responsible for the review and approval 
of the facility plan for the Deepwater Horizon.  MMS did this job 
without any interagency review of the plan or the MMS proposed 
approval of it.   
Section 311 required that the facility plan “identify, and ensure by 
contract or other means approved by the President the availability of, 
private personnel and equipment necessary to remove to the maximum 
extent practicable a worst case discharge (including a discharge resulting 
                                            
 32. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d) (2006). 
 33. Id. § 1321(d)(2)(A), (H).   
 34. Id. § 1321(j)(4)(A). 
 35. THE GULF STRIKE TEAM, AN FOSC’S GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE 36 
(2008), available at www.uscg.mil/hq/nsfweb/docs/FOSCGuidev07.pdf. 
 36. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(4)(C). 
 37. Id. § 1321(j)(4)(C)(vi).    
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from fire or explosion) . . . .”38  Such plans were required to be updated 
periodically and resubmitted for approval with each significant change.39 
As the National Commission’s Report documents, and as quickly 
became apparent, the facility plan failed to work: “BP’s oil-spill response 
plan for the Gulf of Mexico claimed that response vessels provided by 
the Marine Spill Response Corporation and other private oil-spill 
removal organizations could recover nearly 500,000 barrels of oil per 
day.  Despite these claims, the oil-spill removal organizations were 
quickly outmatched.”40  The Interior Department could not have 
performed the most basic due diligence on the plan before approving it; 
two comic mistakes showed that the plan was badly out of date and not 
tailored to Gulf waters:   
• it listed as a key emergency consultant someone who had 
been dead for several years when the plan was submitted;  
• it referred to protection of seals and walruses, creatures not 
found in the Gulf of Mexico in human memory. 41 
More fundamentally, the plan failed to take the possibility of a 
catastrophic well blowout seriously enough and to require adequate 
preparations to address such a disaster.  Despite the large scale of this 
and other deepwater drilling operations in the Gulf, those approving the 
plan omitted Coast Guard review or consultation with any other agency 
about the plan’s sufficiency.  Consequently, the mistaken plan 
assumptions remained unexamined by the most knowledgeable response 
agencies.   
III.  ROLES FOR STATE AND LOCAL ELECTED OFFICIALS 
A.  Failure to Include Local Elected Officials 
Admiral Allen testified that he had participated in an April 2002 drill 
for a “spill of national significance” (SONS) as the incident 
commander.42  That drill had taken place in the New Orleans Superdome 
and had assumed a well blow-out about eighty miles west of where the 
Deepwater Horizon sank eight years later.43  In retrospect, Admiral Allen 
                                            
 38. Id. §1321(j)(5)(D)(iii). 
 39. Id. §1321(j)(5)(D)(v), (vi).  
 40. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 132. 
 41. Id. at 133.  
 42. ALLEN TESTIMONY, supra note 1, at 37. 
 43. Id.  
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explained that while that 2002 drill had seemed to go “pretty well,” 
experience with the Deepwater Horizon now led him to believe that 
fundamental changes in area contingency planning had to be made.44  
The Admiral’s critique focused on the absence of local officials and the 
mistaken assumption that state officials could speak for local interests in 
deciding response actions: 
The entire exercise was conducted with a State of Louisiana 
representative, and there were no parishes present.  We know 
now that if you’re going to interact with state and local 
responders at a local level – and it can be a county in Mississippi 
or a parish in Louisiana – that as part of the contingency 
planning process, the designation of sensitive areas, the 
negotiation of protocols for dispersant use, in situ burning, and 
so forth, that has to be taken down to the local government level 
where the responders are going to be interacting with on an 
actual spill.  We can’t always rely on the fact that this will be 
integrated at the state level and that the state will speak with one 
voice for all the political interests of the state.45 
One example of unresolved local conflicts he cited concerned 
whether to give greater protection to marshes or beaches.46 The 
contingency plans made marsh protection a priority because of their 
sensitivity and the difficulty cleaning them.47  Beaches are much easier to 
clean so “there is a presumption in response doctrine that you will push 
oil to a beach because it can be recovered there.”48  Admiral Allen 
testified that this is “not universally agreed within the Gulf,” in part 
because of economic losses to beachfront communities. 49 
According to the National Commission’s Report, parishes and 
counties made noisy and conflicting demands for booms and skimmers, 
and for their deployment in places where they would not work or not 
work very well.50  These demands sometimes caused the allocation of 
these resources based on political demands rather than the most urgent 
need.51  These were tangible local “nullifications” of the contingency 
plans, sometimes hindering rather than helping the overall response.  
                                            
 44. Id. at 38. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 40. 
 47. Id. at 39. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.  
 50. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 153. 
 51. Id. at 154. 
2011] Spills of National Significance and State Nullification 365 
 
Much of this controversy resulted from the failure to include local 
elected officials in the earlier planning efforts.  These elected leaders had 
no stake in those earlier plans: as the National Commission’s Report 
noted, when one state official was told he was departing from the 
previously approved contingency plan, he said simply that he had not 
signed it.52  
These elected leaders had angry constituents demanding immediate 
action to protect their parishes, counties, beaches, and fishing grounds, 
and they saw an inadequate and, at times, bumbling response by BP and 
the federal government.  These elected officials had every incentive to 
ignore or denigrate contingency plans which seemed to be working very 
badly, and to push hard to protect local interests.  These officials’ lack of 
familiarity with some aspects of oil spill cleanup also led them to 
demand steps which were ineffective, such as trying to boom waterways 
where strong tidal flows predictably moved oil past the booms.53  Despite 
these problems, these local leaders might reasonably argue that their 
constituents might forgive their mistakes, but not their inaction, and that, 
it in any event, it would be hard to do a worse job than BP appeared to be 
doing.  
B.  Conflicts with Other Emergency Procedures 
Admiral Allen and other witnesses before the National Commission 
explained that elected officials in the Gulf were far more familiar with 
emergency procedures under the Stafford Act, used in order to respond to 
hurricanes and other disasters.54  Under the Stafford Act, the President 
acts on a governor’s request for a disaster declaration; once the President 
does so, state and local governments generally take the lead in 
responding, using federal financial assistance to help pay for the 
response efforts.55  That approach is quite familiar to state and local 
                                            
 52. Id. at 139. 
 53. Id. at 154. 
 54. ALLEN TESTIMONY, supra note 1, at 34 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5195 (2006)); 
NAT’L OIL SPILL COMM’N MEETING, NATIONAL OIL SPILL COMMISSION ON BP DEEPWATER 
HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING 66-67 (2010), available at 
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Transcript-
%20Meeting%203.pdf [hereinafter HARRELL TESTIMONY] (statement of Richard Harrell, 
On-Scene Commander for Alabama). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5195 (2006). 
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governments in the Gulf, both from actual experience and from annual 
Gulf-wide hurricane drills in which they participate.56   
By contrast, the federal government is clearly in control of OPA 
response efforts.  OPA and section 311 contemplate rapid seaborne 
responses which states are not equipped to handle and which require the 
on-scene commander (OSC) to make quick decisions without waiting to 
consult “chairborne” superiors on shore, much less state and local 
politicians untrained in commanding a vessel or leading a dangerous 
maritime rescue operation.  The statute expressly contemplates responses 
as dramatic as sinking a vessel where the OSC considers such steps 
necessary.57  In keeping with this approach, Admiral Allen explained that 
he viewed his role as National Incident Commander as being responsible 
for dealing with high level political and policy issues, while avoiding 
micromanagement of officers on the scene.58 
Nine days after the Deepwater Horizon explosion, as it became 
apparent that the combined BP and federal response was failing to 
contain the discharge, Governor Jindal of Louisiana declared a state of 
emergency, followed the next day by such declarations from Mississippi, 
Alabama, and Florida.59  As the Commission Report explained: 
At the outset of the spill, the pre-designated State On-Scene 
Coordinators for Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi 
participated in the Unified Command.  These officials were 
career oil-spill responders: familiar with the National 
Contingency Plan, experienced in responding to spills, and 
                                            
 56. HARRELL TESTIMONY, supra note 54, at 68. The blundering response of all levels 
of government to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 illustrates some of the severe limitations of 
the Stafford Act approach.  The Bush Administration was severely condemned for its 
failure to federalize the response to the Hurricane without waiting for requests from the 
State of Louisiana.  Ironically, President Bush asked Admiral Allen to take command of 
the federal response from the FEMA director when the federal disaster relief effort 
faltered so badly in the first days after Katrina.  The political lesson of Katrina is that 
neither the public nor the press has patience with jurisdictional issues when the 
substantive response fails to work quickly, effectively, and visibly.   
 57. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1)(B)(iii) (2006). 
 58. See ALLEN TESTIMONY, supra note 1, at 21 (stating that “as a 39-year veteran of 
the Coast Guard, the last thing anybody wants is what we would call the 3,000-mile 
screwdriver making adjustments and changes.  So one of the first principles was that we 
would leave tactical control as close to the problem as we could, and that we would try 
and develop awareness in Washington.  And then the staff and myself would travel back 
and forth, which we did, weekly, to not only see what was going on on-scene downrange, 
but also to take care of the extraordinary amounts of data required to brief up to the 
various levels of government and to deal with the media as well”).  
 59. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 138. 
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accustomed to working with the Coast Guard.  Some had 
participated in the 2002 spill exercise run by Admiral Allen.  
They shared the Coast Guard’s view that the responsible party is 
an important ally, not an adversary, in responding to a spill . . . 
[with unprecedented state involvement] State and local officials 
largely rejected the pre-spill plans and began to create their own 
response structures.60 
The states as well as affected parishes and counties set up their own 
response centers, duplicating existing procedures and slowing down 
decisions needed in the response.61  The states and localities demanded 
and received money from BP to help fund these efforts.62  The Coast 
Guard eventually assigned liaison personnel to these additional command 
centers in order to improve coordination.63  Despite the untidiness and 
fragmentation of the state and local responses, the state and local 
emergency declarations resulted in mobilization of additional response 
personnel and resources, including the National Guard.64 
The conflicting state and local responses were sometimes chaotic.  
At that point in the response effort, however, neither BP nor the federal 
government could claim that their combined response was stopping or 
containing the discharge.  From the governors’ perspective, they needed 
to take local command because of the failure of federal efforts.  As for 
the criticism that the procedures had not been blessed in advance by the 
Area Contingency Plan, the governors could reasonably claim that such 
independence of the failed federal effort was a virtue, not a defect.  
Politically, establishing state independence from both the federal 
government and more particularly from BP was an additional virtue.   
The turmoil also provided Louisiana the opportunity to press for 
federal approval and BP financing to build many miles of sand berms to 
protect barrier islands.  The sand berm idea had originally been advanced 
before the spill to address the alarming loss of wetlands along the 
Louisiana coastline, an issue made acute by Hurricane Katrina.65  
Although federal reviewers argued that the proposed construction could 
not be completed in time to prevent oil from reaching the shorelines and 
might do more environmental harm than good, Governor Jindal and local 
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officials pressed hard for federal approval in late May meetings with 
President Obama.66  Federal approval was eventually given, and the bill 
sent to BP.  In practice, only a small portion of the proposed berm project 
was were completed before the discharge was contained.  Little oil was 
stopped; but the bill, for more than $220 million, was by far the costliest 
containment measure per barrel of oil contained or removed.67  There 
may have been good environmental reasons to build the berms, but 
effective protection against oil pollution was not one of them.  
IV.  ACCURATE INFORMATION AND TECHNICAL EXPERTS 
A.  Source Control and Bad Information 
Initial source control efforts focused on trying to make the blow-out 
preventer (BOP) work as it should have in the first place.68  These efforts 
were largely frustrated because the BOP had been altered in the field, but 
the changes had not been recorded, resulting in control and closure 
efforts focused on the wrong controls.69 
Although BP acted quickly after the sinking to survey the damage to 
the undersea well and related equipment, early BP and federal estimates 
of the discharge volume and flow rate—initially reported as around 
1,000 barrels a day, soon increased to 5,000 barrels a day—were 
disastrously wrong, as the true figure was apparently nearer 60,000 
barrels a day.70  Corrections to the 5,000 barrels per day estimate came 
very slowly.  It was not until late May that the federal government began 
systematic efforts to evaluate these estimates.71  These later federal 
efforts eventually resulted in the approximate 60,000 barrel per day 
estimate.72 
Admiral Allen testified that his decisions were unaffected by the bad 
information about discharge rate because units were dispatched on the 
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theory that everything available was needed, and that conditions could 
grow worse quickly.73   
But BP’s source control responses were apparently more adversely 
affected by these mistaken figures.  For example, BP’s early efforts to 
put a containment dome on the discharge failed.  The failure resulted in 
large part because natural gas forms methane hydrate crystals at the 
temperatures and pressures found at a 5,000 foot depth.74  BP 
substantially underestimated the volume of hydrocarbons being 
discharged, including methane, and so underestimated the methane 
hydrate problem when it made its calculations for the containment 
dome.75  While it is unclear if the containment dome could have 
succeeded if the accurate information had been used, it is likely that had 
BP used more accurate data, BP would instead have focused on more 
promising approaches rather than the risky containment dome.76 
The underestimated discharge volume also adversely affected the 
“top kill” and “junk shot” efforts.  “A top kill . . . involves pumping 
heavy drilling mud into the top of the well through the BOP’s [Blow-out 
Preventer] choke and kill lines, at rates and pressures high enough to 
force escaping oil back down the well and into the reservoir.”77  BP 
engineers used the 5,000 barrel per day figure in their planning; when the 
actual figure was closer to 60,000 barrels.78  A BP engineer had 
reportedly calculated that the effort would not work if the discharge 
exceeded 13,000 barrels per day.79  By underestimating the discharge 
volume, these efforts underestimated the pressure needed to stop the 
discharge.  These efforts failed.  
Similarly, BP had too little collection capability at the well site to 
handle the actual volume discharged once it was able to put the “top hat” 
in place to funnel oil to collection vessels at the surface.80  
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Whether BP could have made these earlier efforts succeed if it had 
used the correct discharge volume information is debatable.  The 
containment dome available probably could not have been modified to 
handle the larger discharge; it is unclear if enough pressure could have 
been brought to bear for the “top kill” to succeed, even if correct figures 
had been known.  It is also unclear whether any additional production 
vessels to collect and process the oil could have been deployed sooner.   
It is very clear, however, that the dissemination of the early and 
inaccurate information, BP’s reliance on these figures as the basis to 
make several highly public but unsuccessful source control efforts, and 
the grudging manner in which corrections were made, badly damaged 
both BP’s and the federal government’s credibility.  As a result, state and 
local elected officials came under great pressure to do something else to 
protect their constituents’ property and livelihoods, since the BP and 
federal efforts had lost public confidence.   
B.  Technical Experts, Federal and Private 
As the federal spill response effort floundered and as BP’s initial 
efforts to control the well failed, President Obama asked Dr. Steven Chu, 
Secretary of Energy and Nobel Prize winning physicist, to become 
personally involved in the supervision of BP’s source control efforts.81  
Dr. Chu made some significant contributions to the effort, such as the 
suggestion to use gamma ray imaging of the blow-out preventer.82  He 
also brought in many other highly capable federal scientists, who made 
significant contributions.83 
Secretary Chu’s involvement is a testament to his talent, skill, and 
the great regard in which he is held.  It made great journalism.  It was 
good politics, as it was an easily understood way to demonstrate the 
President’s commitment to fixing the problem. 
Sadly, it is also a searing indictment of the current system that it was 
necessary to enlist the Secretary of Energy to do line-level scientific 
oversight, when his statutory duties are to supervise a vast federal 
scientific establishment, including the nation’s nuclear energy programs 
and many national laboratories. 
As the National Commission’s report makes clear, the MMS lacked 
the expertise needed to oversee BP’s spill response.84  No other agency 
                                            
 81. Id. at 148. 
 82. Id. at 149. 
 83. Id. at 148. 
 84. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 135-136. 
2011] Spills of National Significance and State Nullification 371 
 
seemed to have that expertise either.  Scientists and engineers from other 
companies were also brought in to consult, but their role was unclear and 
BP had legitimate concerns about conflicts of interest.85   
The provisional company of federal scientists and engineers detailed 
to the task, aided by outside scientists, eventually provided very good 
technical oversight of BP’s decisions, but not until more than a month 
had elapsed and much damage had occurred.86  According to the National 
Commission’s report, their efforts were grafted onto the spill response 
and their contributions unevenly shared with those who would have 
benefited from their insights.87   
V.  BETTER SPILL RESPONSE AVOIDS NULLIFICATION 
The problems identified by Admiral Allen and in the National 
Commission’s report are very serious. These problems suggest that major 
reforms are needed in the United States’ spill response system to avoid 
repeating serious mistakes with the Deepwater Horizon when the next 
spill of national significance occurs, particularly if it occurs in 
connection with offshore oil and gas production.  The needed changes, 
however, require much less in the way of statutory revision than 
revisions in the way the United States implements current legal 
requirements. 
A.  Build Federal Scientific and Engineering Review Capability, 
 and Use It 
The facility response plan for the Deepwater Horizon failed.  That 
failure did not result from an inadequate statutory requirement in the 
Clean Water Act, but from the failure of those responsible for approving 
the facility response plan to check its claims or assumptions properly 
before doing so.  Perhaps these failures occurred because those 
responsible for approving it were not responsible for the spill response.  
The plan’s claims about adequate response capability proved false when 
they mattered most.  Federal regulators need to be provided with the 
personnel and expertise to conduct a serious review of these plans; that 
capacity was plainly lacking for the Deepwater Horizon’s plan.   
Current political attacks on federal employees’ pay, work ethic, and 
professionalism, as well as current efforts to make wholesale cuts in 
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regulatory agencies, suggest that these problems will arise again unless 
Congress recognizes that such shortcuts are dangerous and likely to cost 
the country dearly in the long run.  Here, the solution lies in the 
appropriations and budget process much more than in any amendments 
to OPA or section 311 of the Clean Water Act. 
B.  Engage State and Local Elected Leaders in Planning and Practicing 
Spill Response 
For a spill of national significance, the public expects their state and 
local officials to become fully engaged in the response.  In order for that 
response to work well, these leaders need to be made an integral part of 
the planning process.  Right now, they are not.  For these large scale spill 
responses, the NCP should be revised to encourage active participation 
by elected leaders in Area Contingency Plans and in key drills.  Area 
Contingency Plans can be revised to assure that they are better integrated 
with state disaster preparedness procedures, such as activation of the 
National Guard, and the exercise of other state and local emergency 
powers to aid in response to major spills.  Similarly, the NCP should be 
revised to provide for regular Coast Guard cooperation with these elected 
officials as a matter of course in the event of such a large scale spill.  
These responses need to be practiced regularly if they are to work 
well, just as hurricane responses are practiced annually in the Gulf.  If 
elected leaders are engaged as such, they will have ownership of the plan 
and its response, and probably be more productive partners in the 
response.  Regular press coverage of these drills, noting the contributions 
or absence of key elected leaders, will help establish a public expectation 
of participation, one that can be turned into a political issue by opponents 
if a leader skips these drills.   
C.  Provide for Rigorous Scientific and Engineering Oversight of 
Responsible Party Response Operations 
The jury-rigged scientific oversight pulled together by the federal 
government in the Deepwater Horizon response underlined the need to 
have these scientific review procedures established in advance, including 
the assignment of key technical experts.  Like other aspects of spill plans, 
these assignments need to be updated frequently in order to work in an 
emergency. Current responses could be substantially strengthened if a 
similar requirement were imposed as part of area and facility response 
plans, required to be updated periodically and tested annually by 
regulators. 
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Superfund, like OPA and section 311 of the Clean Water Act, 
provides that responsible parties can take the lead in conducting removal 
and responses actions.88  In order to do so under Superfund, however, the 
statute requires that an oversight contractor be retained at the responsible 
party’s expense in order to assist EPA in reviewing that response.89  That 
approach can work under OPA, provided that such arrangements are 
made in advance with reputable engineering firms approved by both the 
Coast Guard and the Department of the Interior agency assigned to 
review such spill response plans. Once again, updating these assignments 
and testing them regularly will be essential to having them work in an 
actual emergency. 
D.  Insist on Accurate and Independent Information About the Discharge 
for Government Officials Making Decisions About the Response 
The erroneous information about the most basic aspects of the 
Deepwater Horizon discharge greatly damaged public confidence in the 
response and helped push state and local governments to act 
independently of established spill response mechanisms.  The National 
Commission has made detailed recommendations about steps to assure 
adequate instrumentation of drilling equipment so that this problem is not 
repeated.90  Similarly, detailed information about the as-built aspects of 
the drilling operation needs to be accurate and readily available, to avoid 
the “wheel-spinning” that occurred when the blow-out preventer controls 
were modified on the Deepwater Horizon but the records were not 
provided to those trying to operate it after the sinking. 
Experience with this spill underlines the importance of having the 
federal government independently verify critical information about the 
spill, to do so early, and to update the information regularly.  While an 
oversight contractor can do much of the oversight of the responsible 
party, this information is sufficiently critical to the response that the 
federal government, probably through the Coast Guard, needs to develop 
the capability to conduct its own assessments of spill conditions.  This 
means acquiring the remotely operated submersibles and key personnel 
needed to operate them, as well as the expertise needed to evaluate the 
results.  That capability will be important to assure the public about the 
accuracy of the information and to make sure responsible parties are not 
ignoring or missing adverse information. 
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VI.    CONCLUSION  
Admiral Allen and the National Commission both have given the 
country very thoughtful advice about how to avoid repeating the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster.  This article has focused on how these 
lessons might be best applied in planning spill responses, so that the 
United States can avoid committing similar mistakes when the next spill 
of national significance occurs.  Many of these changes can be 
accomplished under existing law, provided that Congress and the 
Administration recognize that much of the solution lies in carrying out 
existing legal commitments with adequate resources and attention and 
engaging state and local elected leaders as well as key federal officials. 
 
 
